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We characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when bor-
rowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors
of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the
penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default probabilities. Borrowers'
limited liability is endogenous when \judicial errors" exist, strategic default
appears at equilibrium depending on the borrowers' absolute risk aversion. We
show that at equilibrium loan contracts exhibit a penalty such that borrowers
never strategically default. This is true with IARA and CARA utility func-
tion. Finally, we show that with DARA, strategic default may exist. c ° 2004
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1. INTRODUCTION
Agents typically face adverse selection and moral hazard on credit mar-
kets. This problem is particularly severe in consumer credit markets where
loans are small in size and are not collateralized (giving few incentives to
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control). Moreover, ex-post, privacy laws often allow consumers not to
disclose information on their wealth. Bequests and gifts allow households
to modify or conceal their actual wealth. Indeed, if lenders cannot observe
the borrower's wealth, the latter will be tempted to strategically default
on their debt. Anticipating this, creditors will raise loan rates. This can
ultimately lead to the breakdown of the loan market.
The literature on costly state veri¯cation claims that the moral haz-
ard problem can be solved if the lender can commit to verify ex-post the
borrowers' wealth and/or if the parties can contractually agree on large
penalties for those borrowers who strategically default on their debt. In
particular, with in¯nite penalties, the ¯rst-best allocation may be achieved.
Intuitively, very large penalties provide the right incentive for borrowers to
report their ¯nancial situation truthfully to the creditor, even if the latter
audits only with a very small probability. Consequently, the asymmetric
information can be eliminated at a cost which tends to zero as the au-
dit probability becomes su±ciently small. This result was ¯rst stated by
Becker (1968).
The use of unbounded penalties to induce agents to correctly reveal their
information has been subject to many criticism. Stigler (1970) introduces
the idea of marginal deterrence according to which crime should be pun-
ished taking into account the involved social cost. Polinsky and Shavell
(1979) underline the role of risk aversion in limiting penalties, an argu-
ment that is particularly relevant in the context of consumer credit where
most risks borne by borrowers are uninsurable.
However, most existing models introduce an exogenous upper limit to
the penalty that can be imposed to defrauders (Towsend, 1979, Mookerjee
and Pn'g, 1989, Border and Sobel, 1987), or assume that there is limited
liability on the part of the borrower (Gale and Hellwig, 1985). Under
limited liability, as shown by Khalil and Parigi (1998) and Simmons and
Garino (2003), strategic default may exist in equilibrium if lenders cannot
commit on their audit strategy ex-ante. The existence of strategic default
is necessary to induce lenders to audit defaulters. On the contrary, without
strategic default, lenders would not want to audit ex-post, which in turn
would induce borrowers to strategically default. As a result, there may not
exist any equilibrium without strategic default. Then, the exogenous rule
of limited liability goes against maximizing welfare in the economy in the
absence of commitment. However, not only the universality of the limited
liability rule but also homestead or exemptions rules in the US or over-
indebtness commissions in France, tell us that there must be something
wrong with any model yielding that kind of result.
In this paper, we want to determine the optimal value of the penalty
as the result of an endogenous welfare-improving mechanism. In order to
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commit on their auditing strategy and where borrowers are risk averse.
Moreover, we introduce the possibility that the audit be subject to errors.
More speci¯cally, we assume that the outcome of the audit is a signal imper-
fectly correlated with the borrower's ¯nancial situation.1 The possibility of
\judicial error" provides an argument in favor of limiting penalties, exactly
as the one used by the opponents to the death penalty. In this setting, we
jointly determine the level of the penalty, the loan rate, the audit probabil-
ity and the probability of strategic default that will prevail at equilibrium.
We show that when the audit technology is imperfect, strategic default
may or may not exist in equilibrium depending upon the parameters of the
problem and the borrowers' attitude toward risk. This result is one of the
main contributions of the paper. This result is in contrast with the one
obtained by Khalil and Parigi (1998).
We ¯rst examine the case of constant absolute risk aversion, which en-
tails risk neutrality as a special case. We show that the equilibrium loan
contract is such that the contractual penalty will be large enough to induce
borrowers to never strategically default on their debt. Any other contract
with a smaller penalty would be Pareto-dominated. Then we argue that
the same result holds when absolute risk aversion is increasing in wealth.
Finally, we prove that when the utility function exhibits decreasing abso-
lute risk aversion, strategic default may exist in equilibrium with limited
punishment determined by the value of parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model. We then describe the lenders and borrowers' strategies at equilib-
rium and the general features of the equilibrium contracts. In section 3,
we characterize the conditions on the borrowers preferences under which
the ¯ne that arises as an equilibrium implies no strategic default at equi-
librium. Section 4 deals with the case where the borrowers' utility function
exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. In section 4, we present a nu-
merical example to illustrate our results. The last section concludes the
paper.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
We consider an economy of ex-ante identical consumers and two dates. At
date t = 0, consumers want to purchase a quantity m of a good whose price
is normalized to unity. They obtain a private bene¯t B from consuming
the good. Consumers have no cash at date t = 0, so they need to borrow
an amount m in order to ¯nance their purchase. At date 1, each consumer
earns an income ! + e w: We interpret ! as the value of durables earned by
1In particular, we consider the risk of error in which the audit states that borrowers can
repay whereas they have exogeneous negative shocks on income (as illness or divorce...).360 DAVID ALARY AND CHRISTIAN GOLLIER
the consumer. We assume that this \income" can be pledged by the lender
only through a prosecution.2 It cannot be used by borrowers to repay
either because borrowers do not know how to sell durables or because they
are illiquid. The random labor income is denoted e w . It is the only source
of income directly pledgeable by the lender. It can take two values: y > 0
if employed or 0 if unemployed, respectively with probability p and 1 ¡ p.
Consumers are risk-averse with an increasing and concave utility function
u for consumption at date 1.
There exists a competitive market for standard debt contracts at date 0.
Lenders are risk-neutral and their cost of funds is equal to zero. Lenders
do not observe the income shock experienced by borrowers. However, they
can audit borrowers' earnings at a cost c. This asymmetric information
raises the problem of ex-post moral hazard or strategic default: employed
borrowers may want to claim that they are unemployed. Contrary to the
standard literature, we assume that lenders can choose the audit technol-
ogy. They have the choice between three technologies : a perfect one, and
two imperfect technologies. The perfect technology is such that the audit
signal perfectly reveals the state of nature. In an imperfect technology, the
audit signal is imperfectly correlated with the true state of nature. In order
to characterize these imperfect technologies, let us consider that the audit
signal e s may take value 0 or y: We use the following notation:
® = Pr[e s = 0 j e w = y];
and
¯ = Pr[e s = y j e w = 0]:
Parameter ® is the probability that the auditor misleadingly observes that
a borrower is unemployed.Conversely, ¯ is the probability that the audit
signals that the borrower is employed whereas he is actually unemployed.
The perfect technology is characterized by ® = ¯ = 0. The ¯rst imperfect
technology is such that ¯ = 0 and ® > 0 and the last one is such that ® ¸ 0
and ¯ > 0. Using Bayes' rule, we obtain
Pr[e w = y j e s = y] =
p(1 ¡ ®)
p(1 ¡ ®) + (1 ¡ p)¯
:
Notice that a signal e s = y increases the probability that e w = y only
if Pr[e w = y j e s = y] > p, i.e., if ® + ¯ · 1: Without loss of generality,
we hereafter assume that this inequality holds.3 Parameters ® and ¯ are
2In France, durables can only be seized in presence of an usher and after a judicial
decision.
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common knowledge. We assume that the audit signal is observable and
veri¯able by the lender and the borrower once the audit cost has been paid
by the lender.
The timing of the game is as follows: At date 0, the competitive market
for loans opens, and loan contracts are signed. At date 1, borrowers observe
the realization of income e w and decide whether to report R = y or R = 0 to
the lender. Lenders thereafter decide whether or not to audit the borrowers'
income. If they audit, the signal is observed by the two parties. Finally,
monetary payments are made according to the loan contract.
Individual strategies are characterized by the probability µ to report
R = 0 for borrowers with e w = y, and by the probability ° for the lender
to audit borrowers who reported R = 0. We assume in this paper that the
lender cannot commit on the probability of audit. Thus, the loan contract
does not specify the audit probability °.4
The contract sets monetary transfers contingent on the report of the
borrower and the audit signal when available. When there is no audit,
the borrower pays m(1 + r) to the lender when he reports e w = y; and 0
otherwise. When there is an audit, the borrower pays f, if the audit signal
is not congruent with the report, and 0 otherwise. f should be interpreted
as a combination of a pecuniary fee and the pecuniary equivalent of a non
pecuniary punishment.5
3. TYPOLOGY OF EQUILIBRIA
We ¯rst examine a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where both parties use
mixed strategies and establish hereafter the di®erent conditions that sup-
port this equilibrium. We start by analyzing the behavior of borrowers
with e w = y who have to decide whether to report R = 0 or R = y.
Let Uy ´ u(! + y ¡ m(1 + r)) denote borrowers' utility if they tell the
truth. Borrowers will randomize only if they are indi®erent between the
two strategies. This yield
Uy = ° [(1 ¡ ®)u(! + y ¡ f) + ®u(! + y)] + (1 ¡ °)u(! + y). (1)
The right-hand-side of this equality measures the risk borne by defrauders.
If they strategically default, consumers are audited with probability °. In
this case, they pay a ¯ne f only when the audit is not mistaken. With
4We assume that R = 0 with probability 1 when w = 0. Under our assumptions, this
is optimal for the borrower because we assume that the lender cannot reward borrowers
when R = a = y: Otherwise, when ® > 0; the borrower with w = 0 may be tempted to
declare R = y in the hope to get the reward by mistake. This would in turn induce the
lender to audit reports R = y. This does not seem to be a realistic case. It would be
nice however to endogenize this in a more general model. This is left for future research.
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probability 1¡°; they are not audited and pay nothing. Condition (1) can
be rewritten as
° =
u(! + y) ¡ u(! + y ¡ m(1 + r))
(1 ¡ ®)[u(! + y) ¡ u(! + y ¡ f)]
. (2)
This optimality condition for the borrower implies that the probability of
audit is decreasing in the ¯ne f, and that it is increasing with the loan rate
and with the probability ® = Pr[e s = 0 j e w = y]: Notice that condition (2)
makes sense if and only if f is positive.
We now turn to the audit strategy of the lender. The ex-post incentive
of the lender to audit comes from the expectation to collect ¯nes from
defrauders. He wants to randomize his audit strategy if he is indi®erent
between auditing and not auditing. This yields
[±¯ + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ®)]f ¡ c = 0, (3)
where ± is the probability that the borrower reporting R = 0 tells the
truth. The left-hand-side of this equality is the expected revenue of the
lender when he audits. The ¯ne f is collected either by mistake from a
truthtelling unemployed borrower with probability ±¯, or from a defrauder
with probability (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ®). The audit cost c is paid with probability
1. Using Bayes rule, we obtain that
± = Pr[e w = 0 j R = 0] =
1 ¡ p
1 ¡ p + µp
: (4)
Combining conditions (3) and (4) yields
µ =
(1 ¡ p)(c ¡ ¯f)
p[(1 ¡ ®)f ¡ c]
: (5)
Assuming as before that ®+¯ < 1; we see from equation (5) that the opti-
mality condition for the audit strategy implies that the probability of fraud
µ is decreasing in the ¯ne f and in the probability ¯ = Pr[e s = y j e w = 0];
whereas it is increasing in the probability ® = Pr[e s = 0 j e w = y]. No-
tice that when the audit signal is not informative (¯ = 1 ¡ ®); there is
no equilibrium in mixed strategy, since condition (5) would imply that
µ = ¡(1 ¡ p)=p < 0: More generally, the µ obtained from condition (5) lies
between 0 and 1 if and only if
¯ ·
c
f
· 1 ¡ ® and (1 ¡ p)¯ + p(1 ¡ ®) ¸
c
f
: (6)
We now turn to the equilibrium condition on the credit market at date 0.
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expected pro¯t per unit of money lent is zero at equilibrium. This yields
p(1 ¡ µ)r + [1 ¡ p(1 ¡ µ)]
·
¡1 + °
[(±¯ + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ®))f ¡ c]
m
¸
= 0: (7)
With probability p(1 ¡ µ); the borrower truthfully reports R = w = y;
which generates pro¯t r to the lender. Otherwise, the loan is lost for the
lender, but some ¯nes may be collected if borrowers' incomes are audited.
It yields an expected pro¯t [±¯ + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ®)]f ¡ c. Using condition
(3), we can rewrite condition (7) as
r =
1 ¡ p(1 ¡ µ)
p(1 ¡ µ)
. (8)
The equilibrium loan rate is increasing in the probability of fraud. Com-
bining this observation with the property that the probability of fraud is
decreasing in the penalty yields the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that ® + ¯ is less than unity. Then, the break-even
loan rate and the incentive-compatible probability of strategic default are
decreasing in the penalty f.
Conditions (2), (5) and (8) determine °;µ, and r as a function of f. In
order to characterize an equilibrium, it must be that the contractible ¯ne
f maximizes the expected utility of the borrower subject to the above-
mentioned constraints:
max
f
EU = pu(! + y ¡ m(1 + r))
+(1 ¡ p)[°¯u(! ¡ f) + (1 ¡ °¯)u(!)] (9)
s:t:
(2),(5),(8),
B + EU ¸ pu(! + y) + (1 ¡ p)u(!): (10)
With probability p, the income of the borrower is y. Because he is in-
di®erent between reporting R = 0 and R = y; his utility in that state
is u(! + y ¡ m(1 + r)). With probability 1 ¡ p; his income is w = 0, in
which case he reports R = 0: With probability °¯; the borrower's income
is audited and it mistakenly signals s = y, in which case he must pay ¯ne
f.
The last inequality in (10) is the participation constraint for borrowers
meaning that B the private bene¯t plus the expected utility obtain through
the debt contract is higher than the utility obtained by not consuming. We
hereafter assume that B is su±ciently large for this condition to hold.364 DAVID ALARY AND CHRISTIAN GOLLIER
4. DOES THERE EXIST AN EQUILIBRIUM WITH
STRATEGIC DEFAULT?
It is easy to see that there cannot exist any equilibrium in which lenders
never audit. By contradiction, if ° = 0; it would always be optimal for em-
ployed borrowers to strategically default on their loan. Because lenders do
not audit, they would never recover their funds. This cannot be an equilib-
rium. However, there may exist equilibria where borrowers never misreport
their incomes, but where it is optimal for lenders to audit defaulting bor-
rowers.
In order to characterize these equilibria, we need to determine how
the level of the ¯ne f a®ects the welfare of borrowers once one takes
into account all the e®ects of a change in f on the strategic variables
(µ;°), and on the equilibrium loan rate r. As seen in (9), borrowers
ends up with Uy ´ u(! + y ¡ m(1 + r)) with probability p, and with
U0 ´ °¯u(! ¡ f) + (1 ¡ °¯)u(!) otherwise: It is easy to check that Uy
is increasing in f. Indeed, from (8), the loan rate r is increasing with the
probability of fraud µ: Moreover, from (5), determining if the probability of
fraud is decreasing with the ¯ne whenever U0 is increasing or decreasing in
f is more di±cult. On the one hand, an increase in f induces a ¯rst-order
stochastically dominated shift in the distribution of consumption condi-
tional on e w = 0; because of the risk of error of the audit technology. On
the other hand, a change in f also a®ects the probability of audit, both
directly and indirectly through the change in the loan rate (condition (2)).
The global e®ect of a change in the contractual ¯ne on the borrower's wel-
fare is thus ambiguous. More precisely, two cases may occur depending on
the audit technology used by lenders.
4.1. Equilibria when ¯ = 0
In this section, we assume that lenders choose a technology where the
unemployed status of the consumer is always revealed by the audit: ¯ =
Pr[e s = y j e w = 0] = 0. This implies that the utility U0 = u(!) is indepen-
dent of the level of the ¯ne and thus the only e®ect of an increase in the
¯ne is to discipline the borrower. A larger f reduces the loan rate r; which
in turn increases both Uy = u(! + y ¡ m(1 + r)) and the expected utility
of the borrower. In this case, there is no equilibrium in which both parties
use mixed strategies.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the audit signal is s = 0 whenever w = 0;
i.e., that ¯ = Pr[e s = y j e w = 0] = 0: Then, there is no equilibrium in mixed
strategies.
Notice that the competitive pressure to raise the penalty has no limit
when ¯ = 0. Remember that when ¯ = 0; lenders never want to auditDEBT CONTRACT, STRATEGIC DEFAULT 365
when there is no strategic default. The existence of strategic default at
equilibrium then depends upon the asymptotic properties of the utility
function at low wealth levels. Let us assume that there exists a minimum
level of survival zmin such that u(z) tends to ¡1 when z tends to zmin
from above. Then, as f tends to ! + y ¡ zmin, convicted defrauders would
get a utility u tending to ¡1: From conditions (2) , lenders and borrowers
will reduce ° down to zero. However from condition (5), we know that µ is
¯nite and positive. Then ° cannot tend to zero. There is no equilibrium
in mixed strategies.
4.2. Equilibria when ¯ > 0
In this section, we show that an equilibrium with no strategic default
may arise when ¯ > 0. Indeed, if the contract includes a su±ciently large
payment f when R = 0 and e s = y, auditing defaulting borrowers may
be optimal for lenders in spite of the common knowledge that there is no
strategic default. The penalty serves in this case as an incentive device for
lenders to audit and for borrowers not to misreport their type. Choosing
such an imperfect technology may be considered as a commitment to audit.
But, when the audit technology may detect a fraud when the unemployed
borrower truthfully reports his status (¯ > 0); the borrower's expected
utility U0 conditional to e w = 0 is a®ected by the risk of error. However if
U0 is increasing in the penalty f, the increase in the loss due to the error
would then be more than compensated by the reduction in the probability
to make such an error. In what follows, we show that non-decreasing
absolute risk aversion is a su±cient condition for U0 to be increasing in the
¯ne. This is the case if the probability of audit is su±ciently decreasing
with f. The largest possible ¯ne would again be an equilibrium in this case
implying no strategic default at equilibrium with ¯ > 0.
It is important to observe that the risk (!¡f;°¯;!;1¡°¯) borne by the
unemployed borrower is not very di®erent from the risk (! + y ¡ f;°(1 ¡
®);!+y;1¡°(1¡®)) borne by the defrauder. This is a useful remark, since
we know from condition (1) that the latter risk has a certainty equivalent
!+y¡m(1+r); which is increasing in f from Lemma 1. Suppose that the
borrower's utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, which
implies that there is no wealth e®ect. Condition (1) can thus be rewritten
as
°(1 ¡ ®)u(! ¡ f) + (1 ¡ °(1 ¡ ®))u(!) = u(! ¡ m(1 + r)): (11)
Using this equation to eliminate ° from U0 yields
U0 = u(!) +
¯
1 ¡ ®
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which is decreasing in r and, from Lemma 1, increasing in f. This completes
the proof that, under CARA, there is no equilibrium with strategic default.
The equilibrium is fully described by the following conditions:
¯f ¡ c = 0; (13)
pr + (1 ¡ p)[¡1 + °(¯f ¡ c)] = 0; (14)
and
° (1 ¡ ®)u(!+y¡f)+(1¡°(1¡®))u(! + y) · u(!+y¡m(1+r)), (15)
or, equivalently,
° ¸ °1 =
1
1 ¡ ®
u(! + y) ¡ u(! + y ¡ mp¡1)
u(! + y) ¡ u(! + y ¡ (c=¯))
: (16)
Condition (13) is the indi®erence condition for the lender to audit or not. If
® is positive, it yields the equilibrium ¯ne f ´ f1 = c=¯. Equation (14) is
the market-clearing condition, which implies that 1 + r = 1=p. Condition
(15) states that employed borrowers don't want to strategically default.
This requires that ° be larger than the threshold °1 characterized in (16).
Such an equilibrium exists if °1 is smaller than unity, i.e., if
(1 ¡ ®)u(! + y ¡ c) + ®u(! + y) · u(! + y ¡ mp¡1): (17)
If this inequality holds, any solution with f = f1; r = (1 ¡ p)=p and
° 2 [°1;1] is an equilibrium with no strategic default. These equilibria,
when they exist, can be ranked according to the Pareto criterion, with
° = °1 being the preferred one.
Finally, if condition (17) is not satis¯ed, it is easy to verify that there
exists an equilibrium with no strategic default, systematic auditing and a
penalty f2 larger than f1 such that
(1 ¡ ®)u(! + y ¡ f2) + ®u(! + y) = u(! + y ¡ mp¡1): (18)
Notice that this case covers the situation where borrowers are also risk
neutral, i.e., when the constant absolute risk aversion tends to zero.
We generalize this result by considering preferences that do not exhibit
constant absolute risk aversion. Our result is summarized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the borrower's utility function exhibits
non-decreasing absolute risk aversion (iARA), i.e., [¡u00(z)=u0(z)]
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Then, there is no equilibrium with strategic default. The equilibrium penalty
equals f1 = c if condition (17) is satis¯ed, otherwise f equals f2 as de¯ned
by equation (18).
Proof. We just prove that U0 is increasing in f when there exists some
strategic default. Following the same argument as in the CARA case exam-
ined above would then yield the result. Di®erentiating condition (1) with
respect to f yields
°0(f)(1 ¡ ®)[u(! + y ¡ f) ¡ u(! + y)]
= °(f)(1 ¡ ®)u0(! + y ¡ f) + U0
y(f): (19)
Fully di®erentiating U0 with respect to f would be nonnegative if and only
if
°0(f)¯ [u(! ¡ f) ¡ u(!)] ¸ °(f)¯u0(! ¡ f): (20)
Eliminating °0 from this inequality by using condition (19) yields
u(!) ¡ u(! ¡ f)
u(! + y) ¡ u(! + y ¡ f)
¸
u0(! ¡ f)
u0(! + y ¡ f) + 1¡®
¯° U0
y(f)
: (21)
From Lemma 1, we know that Uy is increasing in f. This implies that
inequality (21) would automatically be satis¯ed if
u(!) ¡ u(! ¡ f)
u(! + y) ¡ u(! + y ¡ f)
¸
u0(! ¡ f)
u0(! + y ¡ f)
;
or, equivalently, because f is positive,
u(!) ¡ u(! ¡ f)
u0(! ¡ f)
¸
u(! + y) ¡ u(! + y ¡ f)
u0(! + y ¡ f)
: (22)
Using Lemma 2 in the appendix concludes the proof as it states that condi-
tion (22) holds under IARA
The underlying intuition of this result is that judgement errors induce
lenders to audit even when they know there is no strategic default at equi-
librium. One may argue that this way of viewing the errors as a committing
device or an incentive scheme is not satisfactory because it relies on the
fact that the lender knows that the only borrowers that are punished are
honest. However, the contract is accepted by borrowers because it increases
their expected utility. The imperfect audit technology with ¯ > 0 is better
than the audit technology with ¯ = 0. The penalty f can be interpreted368 DAVID ALARY AND CHRISTIAN GOLLIER
as a transfer borrowers have to pay with a given probability in the bad
state of the world. Even if this contract may lead borrowers to be worse o®
in a given state, they are better o® in expectation. This contract Pareto-
dominates all others.
Under the alternative conditions of Propositions 1 and 2, the competitive
pressure to o®er contracts with an increasing penalty when R = 0 and s = y
implies that there is no strategic default at equilibrium. The underlying
assumptions leading to this result are quite restrictive. The assumption in
Proposition 1 that there is no risk of error to punish unemployed borrowers
is not realistic. And the assumption in Proposition 2 about absolute risk
aversion is in contradiction with the well-documented fact that absolute risk
aversion is decreasing. For example, it is well established that wealthier
investors purchase more risky assets, or that consumers with riskier future
incomes raise their precautionary savings.
5. SMALL PENALTIES AND STRATEGIC DEFAULT AT
EQUILIBRIUM
When there is a risk to penalize unemployed borrowers and when absolute
risk aversion is decreasing, imposing large penalties may not be feasible.
To see this, consider again the assumption that there exists a minimum
level of subsistence zmin such that u(zmin) = ¡1. Then, when ¯ > 0;
the solution with f = ! + y ¡ zmin is not feasible. For such a penalty, it
would imply a level of consumption ! ¡f = zmin ¡y smaller than zmin for
unemployed borrowers that have been audited with s = y.
The penalty is limited by the willingness to reduce the e®ect of errors on
borrowers' expected utility.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the borrower's utility function exhibits de-
creasing absolute risk aversion: Then, the ¯ne f must be lower than !¡zmin
and there exist cases involving strategic default.
Proof. Assume that f = !¡zmin. Then by replacing f in (2), we obtain
° =
u(! + y) ¡ u(! + y ¡ m(1 + r))
(1 ¡ ®)[u(! + y) ¡ u(y + zmin)]
. Due to the asymptotic properties
of u, ° is small but ¯nite. Replacing f in the expression of the expected
utility that borrowers receive we obtain
EU = pu(! + y ¡ m(1 + r)) + (1 ¡ p)[°¯u(zmin) + (1 ¡ °¯)u(!)].
But u(zmin) = ¡1 by construction, the expected utility is equal to ¡1.
This implies a contradiction with the participation constraint. Then the
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As previously said, an optimal contract has to verify the following pro-
gram:
max
f
EU = pu(! + y ¡ m(1 + r)) + (1 ¡ p)[°¯u(! ¡ f) + (1 ¡ °¯)u(!)]
s:t:
(2),(5),(8),
B + EU ¸ pu(! + y) + (1 ¡ p)u(!).
Assuming that the participation constraint is always veri¯ed, the ¯rst
order condition of this program is
dr
df
u0(! + y ¡ m(1 + r))
h
p +
(1¡p)¯[u(!)¡u(!¡f)]
(1¡®)[u(!+y)¡u(!+y¡f)]
i
¡(1 ¡ p)¯°
h
u0 (! ¡ f) ¡
[u(!)¡u(!¡f)]
[u(!+y)¡u(!+y¡f)]u0 (! + y ¡ f)
i
= 0.
(23)
If an optimum exists, the optimal penalty to be enforced to a borrower who
strategically defaults should verify this condition. Under the assumption
that u is DARA, it may be the case that this condition is veri¯ed for a ¯ne
such that the strategic default probability is positive. Moreover, it may be
the case that the optimal penalty is softer than limited liability. However
this cannot be proved directly.
6. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
When u is DARA, no analytical solution arises from (23). The following
example provides some interesting insights on changes in the probability of
strategic default, optimal penalties and audit probability. We calibrate the
model with a logarithmic consumer: u(x) = ln(10+x). We assume that ®
and ¯ are strictly positive and such that ® + ¯ < 1. The ¯xed parameter
values we take are: ! = 20 and y = 10 in the good state, p = 0:986 and
® = 0:05. We are interested in variations of the following parameters: the
audit error ® and the audit cost c. In this example, zmin is equal to zero
corresponding to a maximal penalty f¤ of 30.
First, we consider variations of the audit error. In order to isolate the
e®ect of this parameter, we ¯x the value of c = 2 and m = 5. One may
think that the value of m is large considering the value of the income !+y
but it is often the case in consumer credit.7 The e®ects of the variations
of ¯ on the optimal ¯ne and the audit probability are summarized by the
¯gures in the appendix. Figure 1 shows that the ¯ne is decreasing in ¯.
6This probability corresponds to the average repayment probability observed by an
Italian company specialized in consumer credit.
7See \Consumer credit evidence from Italian microdata" R. Alessie, S. Hochguertel,
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Intuitively, the more likely lenders enforce unfair penalties the less they
want to penalize. Moreover, for any positive value of ¯, we obtain that
the penalty is lower than !. The penalty is then softer than required by
limited liability which would imply f¤ = !. An increase in ¯ implies an
increase in the audit probability as shown in ¯gure 2. Since the audit
becomes less e±cient, the lender needs to audit more in order to induce
the right incentives. This increase in the audit probability induces the
successful borrower not to strategically default since this would increase
the probability to be ¯ned. Then the probability of strategic default is
decreasing when ¯ increases. Moreover, at some threshold, the probability
of strategic default becomes equal to zero. For values of ¯ smaller than
this threshold, we can see that it is optimal to tolerate strategic default in
equilibrium.
Equation (8) shows that the interest rate is completely de¯ned by the
strategic default probability. It is straightforward to show that the interest
rate is an increasing function of the strategic default probability. The in-
tuition of this result is simple. If the proportion of employed workers who
strategically default increases, then lenders have to increase the loan rate
paid by honest borrowers in order to earn non-negative pro¯ts.
Now, let us assume that ¯ = 0:02. Consider the e®ects of an increase of
the audit cost c. Figure 4 shows that the audit probability is decreasing
with c. The intuition is simple: when auditing becomes more costly, lenders
prefer to reduce the audit frequency. They arbitrage between the audit
cost and the potential gain that auditing implies. Figure 5 shows that the
equilibrium ¯ne is increasing in the audit cost. This is due to the fact that
since auditing becomes more costly, lenders audit less frequently in order
to reduce the expected audit cost. But lenders have to increase the ¯ne.
Otherwise, borrowers will increase their strategic default probability which
can lead to a market failure. However, the changes in the lenders' auditing
strategy (°;f) are not su±cient to reduce strategic default.
It is intuitive that the probability of strategic default is increasing in
the audit cost. As this increase leads to less attractive auditing conditions
for lenders, borrowers will expect a lower probability to be ¯ned. Even if
the ¯ne may be higher than the previous one, defaulting may still be more
interesting than before. As in the previous case, the interest rate is fully
determined by the probability of strategic default. Since the interest rate
is an increasing function of this probability, it is obvious that the interest
rate increases with the audit cost since µ increases. An increase in the
audit cost reduces the gain to audit. The more costly the audit, the less
e±cient the contract. As shown in the previous section, the ¯ne is always
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7. CONCLUSION
We consider a model of costly state veri¯cation in credit markets. In par-
ticular, we focus on consumer credit markets that exhibit speci¯c features:
borrowers are risk-averse and lenders are unable to commit on auditing
strategies. This is due both to consumer protection and to high costs of
audit with respect to the size of consumption loans. In general, borrowers
may be unable to repay their loan if they face an adverse shock on their
income. In such a setting, borrowers may decide to default even if they are
in the good state of nature. In this context, lenders can decide to audit
defaulting consumers and to ¯ne them in case of an audit con¯rming the
fraud. We characterize credit contracts that appear in equilibrium when
the ¯ne is not exogenously given but arises as an outcome of the game.
We also consider the case where the audit technology is imperfect. By
imperfect we mean both that the audit can mistakenly reveal that a de-
faulter is in a good situation whereas he is in a bad one and that a borrower
who strategically defaults is not found. We show in such a case of imper-
fect audit that, if the expected utility exhibits non-decreasing absolute risk
aversion, there is no strategic default at equilibrium. However, if borrow-
ers' expected utility exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, it may the
case that strategic default arises at equilibrium. Nevertheless, the optimal
¯ne is always ¯nite.
APPENDIX A
Lemma 2. Consider function F(w) =
u(!)¡u(!¡f)
u0(!¡f) , with f > 0.
Function F is increasing (resp. decreasing) when u exhibits DARA (resp.
iARA).
Proof.
Let us assume that u is DARA, implying that A(c) = ¡
u
00(c)
u0(c) is decreasing
in c. F is decreasing if
X = [u0(w) ¡ u0(w ¡ f)]u0(w ¡ f) ¡ [u(w) ¡ u(w ¡ f)]u00(w ¡ f)
is positive. We have that
X =
0 Z
¡f
[u00(w + x)u0(w ¡ f) ¡ u0(w + x)u00(w ¡ f)]dx372 DAVID ALARY AND CHRISTIAN GOLLIER
which in turn is equal to
X = u0(w ¡ f)
0 Z
¡f
u0(w + x)[A(w ¡ f) ¡ A(w + x)]dx
Because w¡f is smaller than w+x for all x 2 [¡f;0] and because A is de-
creasing, we obtain that A(w¡f)¡A(w+x) is positive over the interval of
integration. Thus, X is positive. The symmetric proof holds in the case of
iARA.
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